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Abstract
Eight pilots participated as test subjects in a fixed-
based simulation experiment to evaluate advanced
vision display technologies such as Enhanced Vision
(EV) and Synthetic Vision (SV) for providing terrain
imagery on flight displays in a Lunar Lander Vehicle.
Subjects were asked to fly 20 approaches to the Apollo
15 lunar landing site with four different display
concepts – Baseline (symbology only with no terrain
imagery), EV only (terrain imagery from Forward
Looking InfraRed, or FLIR, and LIght Detection and
Ranging, or LIDAR, sensors), SV only (terrain
imagery from onboard database), and Fused EV and
SV concepts. As expected, manual landing
performance was excellent (within a meter of landing
site center) and not affected by the inclusion of EV or
SV terrain imagery on the Lunar Lander flight
displays. Subjective ratings revealed significant
situation awareness improvements with the concepts
employing EV and/or SV terrain imagery compared to
the Baseline condition that had no terrain imagery. In
addition, display concepts employing EV imagery
(compared to the SV and Baseline concepts which had
none) were significantly better for pilot detection of
intentional but unannounced navigation failures since
this imagery provided an intuitive and obvious visual
methodology to monitor the validity of the navigation
solution.
Introduction
Past aviation research has demonstrated the
substantial potential of synthetic vision (SV) and
enhanced vision (EV) technologies to enable
equivalent visual operations independent of actual
weather and visibility conditions [1-4]. SV is a
computer-generated image of the external scene
topography, generated from vehicle attitude, high-
precision navigation, and data of the terrain, obstacles,
cultural features, and other required flight information
presented to a pilot on his/her flight displays (e.g.,
head-up and head-down primary flight displays,
navigation displays, and auxiliary displays such as
electronic flight bags). EV is an electronic means of
providing a display of the external scene by use of an
imaging sensor, such as Forward-Looking InfraRed
(FLIR) or LIght Detection and Ranging (LIDAR). By
creating, supplementing, or enhancing the natural
vision of the pilot, these vision-based technologies
have been shown to significantly improve situation
awareness, reduce workload, enhance aviation safety
(e.g., controlled-flight-into-terrain prevention and other
hazards detection), and promote flight path control
precision.
The intended use of EV and SV technologies
mirror each other, as they both attempt to eliminate
low-visibility conditions and replicate the operational
benefits of clear-day flight operations, regardless of the
actual outside visibility conditions. The issues that
drove the design and development of synthetic and
enhanced vision have commonalities to other
application domains; most notably, during descent and
landing on moon and planetary surfaces.
To investigate the potential benefits of an EV
and/or SV-enhanced flight deck for spacecraft, the
Apollo lunar landing mission was reviewed. The
Apollo astronauts were tasked with navigating a new
vehicle, the Lunar Module (LM), in an unknown
environment with basic flight instrumentation, mainly
consisting of electro-mechanical gauges (Figure 1).
Astronaut Neil Armstrong identified the landing phase
as being the most difficult part of the Apollo 11
mission [5]; therefore, this experiment chose to focus
on the descent to landing stage. Also, Apollo
experience showed that [6] “the constraints placed on
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crew visibility by the design of the LM window and by
trajectory parameters make the viewing of the
programmed landing site a major problem.” For the
Apollo missions, pilot visibility was of the utmost
importance. The lunar landing task relied on the
pilot’s natural vision, coupled with large forward-
facing windows and operational flight profiles which
allowed the pilot to see the landing zone for extended
periods of time, to perform a visual, manual landing
approach or to re-designate and fly to a new landing
area if the original landing site was not suitable. The
Apollo LM windows provided almost 70 degrees nose-
down visibility.
Figure 1. Apollo Lunar Module
The importance of pilot visibility was not only
emphasized by trajectory design and window
definition, but also, by conducting the Apollo landing
task only at specific times and locations to provide
optimal sun light on the landing site [5]. The mission
was designed around lighting conditions (typically
lasting about a week) that would create shadows
providing optimal depth perception.
In response to a 2004 Presidential directive to
“implement a sustained and affordable human and
robotic program to explore the solar system and
beyond” [7], NASA initiated the Constellation
Program. NASA’s Constellation Program is
developing a new space transportation system to travel
beyond low Earth orbit to initially establish a sustained
human presence on the moon and then go to Mars and
other destinations. Constellation is developing the
Orion Spacecraft, the Altair Lunar Lander, and the
Ares I and V rockets to take humans to the moon to
establish a lunar outpost.
Preliminary concepts and operations [8-9]
anticipated for the Altair Lunar Lander are
contradicting Apollo’s experience in the use of a
pilot’s natural vision as the primary landing aid. First,
preliminary design concepts for a Lunar Lander show
significantly less external visibility for the astronauts
than that provided to the Apollo astronauts. The Altair
design will be significantly larger than the Apollo LM
and the size of the windows and their location may be
severely constrained and non-optimal for pilot
visibility. Second, fuel-optimized trajectories do not
include a “pitch-up” maneuver, as Apollo did, for pilot
visibility through windows. If the need for natural
visibility could be eliminated or reduced, significant
fuel savings could be gained. Finally, future mission
requirements call for frequent landings in the Lunar
polar regions for maximum scientific benefit. The
polar regions exhibit less than ideally lighted lunar
surface locations. The very low sun-angles will create
shadows that can mask landing hazards to a pilot’s
natural vision, such as craters and boulders. Each of
these factors emphasizes the importance of providing
technological capabilities for unfettered moon surface
landings, without sole reliance on a pilot’s natural
vision.
Based on research from the aviation domain, SV
and EV technologies hold significant promise for
planetary missions because the technology presents a
computer-generated (SV) and real-time (EV) view of
the terrain, topography and other significant
characteristics (e.g., habitat modules, power
generators, etc.) independent of the outside visibility
conditions (i.e., darkness, shadow illusions or
obscuration, engine effluent/dust), window locations,
or vehicle attributes. SV allows unconstrained control
of the computer-generated scene lighting, terrain
coloring and virtual camera angles which may provide
invaluable visual cues to pilots/astronauts, not
available from other vision technologies. EV sensors,
such as FLIR and LIDAR, provide real-time imagery
of surface topography and hazards and can provide
real-time integrity monitoring of the SV database.
Vehicle state information (e.g., forward and down
velocities, altitude, and fuel remaining) may be
conformally overlaid on the SV/EV imagery to
enhance trajectory control and overall crew situation
awareness especially when compared to the
information presentation and data display used for the
Apollo LM.
Current Study
The objective of this study was to gain a first-
order assessment of whether the benefits of EV/SV
technologies, shown in the aviation domain, do indeed
carry over to the space domain. This experiment
examined the effects of having terrain imagery on
space vehicle flight displays during lunar approaches
and landings for nominal and off-nominal situations.
The terrain imagery concepts were: (a) EV-only,
(b) SV-only, (c) EV and SV, and (d) Baseline (i.e., no
SV or EV) Head-Down Display Concepts. These
terrain imagery concepts were shown on head-down
displays providing a head-up display (HUD)-like
format, primary flight reference information display,
navigation display (ND), and an ego-centric situation
awareness (SA) information display.
The specific research objectives included: (a)
evaluating the contribution of EV and/or SV
visualization technologies on vehicle flight displays for
approaches and landings to the lunar surface; (b)
evaluating the effects of various vehicle external field-
of-views and EV and/or SV visualization technologies;
(c) evaluating SA and workload during terrain-
challenged, fuel-optimized approaches; and (d)
evaluating the contribution of terrain and hazard




Eight pilots participated as subjects in this
experiment. Because of the powered-lift nature of the
Lunar Lander vehicle and the vertical descent and
landing task, rotorcraft piloting experience was felt to
be important to reduce training time for the simulation.
Pilot subject recruitment was conducted, using
established NASA protocol, requiring subjects to have
a commercial pilot’s license, and if possible, rotorcraft
experience. Six of the evaluation pilots (EPs) had
previous experience flying rotorcraft with an average
of 687 hours of flight time.
Simulation Facility
The experiment was conducted in the Visual
Imaging Simulator for Transport Aircraft Systems
(VISTAS) III rapid-prototyping workstation at NASA
Langley Research Center. VISTAS III is a non-motion
platform, nominally used for crew-vehicle interface
concept development for transport aircraft (Figure 2).
Figure 2. VISTAS III Simulator
For this single pilot experiment, a Logitech Freedom
joystick was added for the pilot interface to the lunar
lander simulation and had pitch/roll/yaw attitude
control, thrust control and 10 programmable buttons
[ 10]. The head-down display concept evaluations were
shown on a 1600x1200 liquid crystal display flat panel
with a 22 inch total display diagonal. Four equal-sized
display areas (9 inches wide by 7 inches high) provided
four flight instrument formats: HUD-like information,
Primary Flight Display (PFD) information, ND
information, and SA information.
The out-the-window (OTW) view consisted of three
1024x1280 displays with a total resolution of 3072
pixels horizontal by 1280 pixels vertical. The total
field-of-view was 72 ° horizontal by 30° vertical with a
resolution of 43 pixels/degree. The out the window
displays were centered vertically to the pilot design eye
point giving an equal 15 ° up and down look angle.
Note that this look-down angle of 15 ° is a limitation of
the VISTAS III facility as it doesn’t allow the 70°
look-down angle of the Apollo windows.
Vehicle and Lunar Properties
Available public-release data on Lunar Lander
concepts were used to derive mass and inertial
properties, from Lunar Orbit Insertion, to the
appropriate trajectory initialization point for each run,
including nominal Reaction Control System fuel
utilization, to that point. The Moon was simulated as a
homogeneous, spherical, rotating mass, for purposes of
this experiment.	 A fourth order Runge-Kutta
integrator was used for state propagation, with a fixed 	 landing cue was displayed in all three terrain
step size of 0.01 seconds. 	 presentations (SV, EV FLIR, and OTW).
Lunar Database
The Apollo 15 landing site was utilized in this
experiment because of the availability of higher
resolution data and the interesting terrain features it
provided. The visual lunar database was created using
lunar topology and imagery data collected by the
Clementine project. Clementine was launched on
January 25, 1994 and collected lunar surface data
during the months of February, March, and April of
that year. A spherical lunar database was created that
covered the entire lunar surface and was built with
three topology and imagery resolutions. Database
coverage for the entire moon was created using a
resolution of approximately 4 kilometers per elevation
post, draped with 1 kilometer per pixel imagery.
Medium resolution data was used around the area of
the Apollo 15 landing site, with approximately 500
meters per elevation post, draped with 125 meter per
pixel imagery. The highest resolution data was used in
the area immediately surrounding the Apollo 15
landing site. This resolution was 15 meters per
elevation post draped with 4 meter per pixel imagery.
The same terrain data were used for the SV, FLIR,
and OTW presentations; however, their display
presentations were altered to roughly approximate the
different sensors and concepts. For the FLIR
presentation, the imagery color was converted to green
based on the intensity of the true color and the
brightness was attenuated based on pixel distance and
elevation/azimuth angle. Random noise was also
inserted. The SV and OTW presentations were
identical except for the addition of boulder hazards in
the OTW scene. Fifty boulders were pseudo-randomly
placed around the Apollo 15 landing site in a 0.015
degree by 0.015 degree area (Figure 3). The boulders
ranged from 0.5 meters in diameter to 10 meters in
diameter. The same boulders were also visible in the
FLIR presentation.
A surface feature (hereinafter referred to as the
lunar landing cue) was placed at the landing site so the
EP’s would have a visual reference to the desired
touchdown point (see Figure 3). The lunar landing cue
was a circular ring that was 60 meters in diameter, 10
meters thick, and two meters high. The ring was
textured with a pseudo lunar surface image and
blended into the lunar surface topology. The lunar
Figure 3. Lunar Landing Cue in OTW View
SV Database
As mentioned in the lunar database section, the
SV database presentation of lunar terrain was identical
to that provided OTW except it did not include the
boulder hazards. The boulders were not present in the
SV terrain to simulate objects which might be too
small to be detected by a terrain data gathering sensor.
Further, as the SV terrain is computer generated, actual
sun angles do not affect the visibility of the terrain.
EV Sensors
Two rudimentary, non-physics-based sensors
were simulated in this experiment: FLIR and LIDAR.
The FLIR presentation was identical to the OTW view
of the lunar terrain, including the boulder hazards and
the lunar landing cue. It was depicted in green on the
display concepts using EV sensor information (see EV
and Fused EV/SV display concepts in Figure 4). The
LIDAR sensor provided a “flash shot” of the lunar
terrain at a 1000 m altitude on approach. The LIDAR
data was not shown directly to the EP, but instead, a
simulated “processed” image of computed hazards was
shown. “LIDAR-detected” hazards were depicted as
transparent, red colored circles (Figure 4) on the
display concepts that used EV sensor information.
These LIDAR-detected hazards were only displayed
after the vehicle had passed through 1000 m altitude.
Independent Variable – Display Concepts
Four flight display concepts (Figure 4) were
evaluated by the EPs while performing lunar
approaches and landings. Each flight display concept
was part of the quad-view of head-down flight
instruments. The quad-view included a HUD (upper
left window), PFD (upper right window), ND (lower
left window), and egocentric Situation Awareness (SA)
Display (lower right window).
Figure 4. Display Conditions – Baseline (upper left), EV (upper right), SV (lower left), and Fused EV/SV (lower right).
The HUD display was attitude-referenced and
showed conformal EV/SV information (when utilized)
and symbology.
The PFD was a standard three-axis “eight-ball”
providing head-down primary flight reference
information. EV and SV information was not added to
this display to ensure uncluttered guidance and
uncompromised full spatial reference information
necessary for the attitude extremes of planetary
descent.
The SA display provided ego-centric symbology
and EV/SV information (when utilized) with a pilot-
controllable vertical pan of the SV information or
simulated EV camera. Pilot-selectable discrete settings
for this vertical pan included: Flight Path Marker
(FPM)-centering, Nadir-centering, and Waterline-
centering. Slewable up/down viewing control to +/- 90
degrees was also provided. By using the SA display
and its variable viewpoint references, critical terrain
and obstacle awareness could be provided, potentially
without the loss of spatial awareness or critical
guidance information.
which the vehicle should avoid landing) were added to
the ND and SA displays.
The ND was a simple two-dimensional, top down
view with own-ship position located at the center of the
display. The synthetic lunar terrain (when utilized)
was layered under the symbology. A touchdown zone
was drawn centered on the designated touchdown site.
Detailed descriptions of the flight instruments
(HUD, PFD, ND, and SA display) and the symbology
used within them can be found in Reference 11.
The symbology used within the four flight
instruments of the pilot’s quad-view were held constant
across each display concept evaluated. Regardless of
the display concept, the “no-plume” zones (amber-
colored areas within which the vehicle shouldn’t fly)
and the touchdown zone symbol were always depicted
on the ND and SA displays.
Within these four instruments, the type of terrain
imagery (EV, SV, fused EV/SV, or none) was
experimentally varied as illustrated in Figure 4.
In the upper left quadrant of Figure 4, the Baseline
Concept is shown. This concept did not include any
head-down terrain imagery. The EP had to rely on the
OTW view and altimeter readings to ascertain the
vehicle’s height above the lunar terrain.
In the upper right quadrant of Figure 4, the EV
Concept is illustrated. The terrain imagery was created
from the simulated FLIR and LIDAR-detected hazard
information. Boresighting errors, sensor abnormalities
and artifacts, vehicle-induced obstructions, or camera-
slewing dynamics were not simulated.
In the lower left quadrant of Figure 4, the SV
Concept is illustrated. Terrain imagery came from an
on-board lunar database, using simulated on-board
navigation state information. Errors in the navigation
solution would degrade the accuracy of SV information
and could cause a notable discrepancy between it and
the OTW view.
In the lower right quadrant of Figure 4, the Fused
EV/SV Concept is illustrated where the terrain imagery
was a fusion of EV and SV information. A simple
blending of the EV and SV information was selected
for the fusion. Above 335 m altitude, the terrain
imagery was purely SV on the HUD, ND, and SA
display. Below 335 m altitude, the terrain imagery was
FLIR on the HUD and SA display and SV on the ND.
Simulated LIDAR-detected hazards (red circles within
Independent Variable – Out the Window Vertical
Field-of-Regard
Two OTW vertical field-of-regard (FOR) views
were varied to experimentally test the criticality of
OTW vision for the approach and landing task. The
two OTW FORs are hereinafter referred to as the Small
OTW and Large OTW views. A fuel-optimized
approach/landing trajectory (i.e., fast and low, or
shallow perspective, with the velocity being arrested
just before touchdown) to the lunar surface was used to
generate the Small OTW view condition. This type of
trajectory is being considered for the Altair lunar
missions [8]. An Apollo-like approach/landing
trajectory was used to generate the Large OTW view
condition. During the final approach phase, Apollo
astronauts were required to use natural vision (through
the LM windows) to monitor safety of flight and
perform landing site assessment.
In VISTAS III, the total OTW view was fixed at
30 deg but simulated body-axis gimbaling (i.e., the
crew-occupied body could be rotated independent of
the engine housing) was employed to modify the look-
down angle and increase the amount of time and
volume of viewable OTW terrain for the EP. For the
Small OTW view condition, gimbaling was not used.
The crew-occupied body was fixed to the engine
housing and the FOR was +/- 15 degrees from the
vehicle boresight. For the Large OTW view condition,
gimbaling biased the look-down angle up to 35 degrees
look down from the boresight. Gimbaling is not
necessarily a desirable or recommended method of
providing crew visibility of the landing site, but for this
experiment it was used as an expedient method of
changing the look-down without changing the task or
the guidance and control laws.
Evaluation Tasks
During an experimental run, EPs performed either
an Approach Task or a Landing Task.
Approach Task
The trajectory for the Approach Task started at
approximately 170 km from the desired landing site,
782 m/s groundspeed, and 11400 m Height Above
Touchdown (HAT). A guidance algorithm
commanded a geometric fifth order profile in altitude,
to a specified endpoint over the mountains 24 km prior
to the desired landing site. The commanded
longitudinal profile approximated a constant “jerk”
(i.e., first derivative of acceleration) profile to a
specified control point, located well after the end of
this guidance phase. Simulated body axis gimbaling
was employed to increase the look-down angle (35
degrees maximum gimbal angle) in the Large OTW
view condition.
Pitch attitude started at approximately 60 degrees,
and gradually decreased to about 30 degrees at the end
of the run. Gimbaling, provided for the Large OTW
view runs only, was linear with range, starting at zero
degrees at 45 km range from the landing site, and
reaching the maximum of 35 degrees at 30 km. In the
Large OTW view condition, terrain ahead of the
vehicle was visible out the window until just prior to
the end of run for the nominal cases and for about 15
seconds prior to terrain impact for the guidance failure
cases (impact could be avoided in these cases by
selecting Abort Mode). For the Small OTW view
condition, the terrain in front of the vehicle was not
visible in the window for any portion of the nominal or
guidance error runs.
The EP’s task was to monitor the vehicle state as
the autopilot was flying the final approach trajectory,
verifying terrain clearance to the mountain range as the
landing site was approached. Each of the displays
provided key elements in assisting the EP to complete
these tasks. When provided, the velocity vector and
terrain imagery on the SA Display, as well as OTW
terrain cues, were used to assess projected terrain
clearance. The PFD information enabled verification
that the vehicle autopilot was flying commanded
guidance, and provided speed, altitude, sink rate, fuel,
and attitude awareness. The HUD provided attitude
awareness, and the ND provided position and
navigation state awareness.
Landing Task
The trajectory for the Landing Task varied,
depending on the selected OTW view condition. For
Small OTW view landings, scenarios started at 14500
m range, 4100 m HAT, and 215 m/s groundspeed.
Large OTW view landings started at 1000 m range,
200 m HAT, and 10 m/s groundspeed. Initial
conditions were chosen to provide approximately five
minute run times for each scenario.
For the initial portion of the landing scenarios, the
guidance algorithm commanded a geometric fifth order
profile in altitude, to a specified control point near the
landing site, and constant “jerk” for the longitudinal
profile. In the final portion of the landing scenarios,
guidance commanded a constant flight path angle to a
hover point 45 m overhead the landing site, with a
constant “jerk” profile in groundspeed.
For the Large OTW view condition, pitch attitude
started at about two degrees, decreasing gradually to
zero over the landing site. For these runs, gimbaling
was used, starting at about 12 degrees at the start of run
(about 1000 m range to landing site), and decreasing to
zero by about 280 m range (at which point, the landing
site was not visible out the window). The combination
of trajectory, pitch attitude, and gimbaling provided
about 70 seconds visibility of the landing site out the
window, for the Large OTW view runs. In addition,
lunar terrain approximately 100 m downrange of the
landing site was visible for approximately 100 seconds
in the Large OTW view condition prior to reaching the
hover point.
For the Small OTW view condition, pitch attitude
started at approximately 55 degrees at the beginning of
the run, and gradually decreased to zero over the
landing site. The landing site was not visible out the
window at any time during these runs. However, lunar
terrain approximately 100 m downrange of the landing
site was visible for approximately 31 seconds in the
Small OTW view condition. This OTW visibility
provided the pilot with some awareness of the terrain
height and ground velocities and position, but a natural
vision view of the landing site was never available in
this condition.
The EP’s task was to continue to monitor the
autopilot during the landing until 50 m altitude. At this
point, the EP was required to take over control from
the autopilot and manually fly the vehicle to the
designated landing site. Each of the displays provided
key elements in assisting the EP to complete these
tasks. When provided, the terrain imagery and velocity
vector on the SA Display, as well as OTW terrain cues,
were used to assess projected path to the landing site.
In the final descent from the hover point to contact, the
Nadir View could be used on the SA display to affect
fine control of the projected touchdown position, and
increase landing accuracy. The PFD enabled
verification that the vehicle autopilot was flying
commanded guidance, and provided speed, altitude,
sink rate, fuel, and attitude awareness. The HUD
provided attitude awareness, and the ND provided
position awareness. Aural cues were provided as
additional altitude and sink rate cues. Aural cues
consisted of a pre-recorded (i.e., not synthesized)
female voice, annunciating the altitude at the following
crossing points in meters: 100, 50, 40, 30, 20, 10, 5, 4,
3, 2, and 1. In addition, the word “contact” was spoken
at simulated ground sensor contact.
Non -Normal Runs
In addition to the nominal final approach and
landing maneuvers, the EPs were exposed to 3
unannounced system failures for both OTW views
(Small, Large): 1) guidance error on approach, 2)
guidance error on landing, and 3) navigation error on
landing.
Guidance Error on Approach
In the approach guidance error scenarios, the
flight director guided the vehicle on a trajectory into
rising terrain prior to the landing site. This error was
simulated by modifying the nominal guidance to use an
erroneous altitude (465 m lower than nominal) and
lateral position (7000 m left of path) for the approach
phase. With this error inserted, if undetected, the
vehicle would impact terrain.
Guidance Error on Landing
In the landing guidance error scenario, the flight
director guided the vehicle to a touchdown point
located in a simulated LIDAR-detected hazardous area.
Guided trajectories were modified from those used in
nominal runs, in that a moderate deviation in along
track (136 m beyond landing site) and cross track (61 m
right of landing site) position was inserted. If
undetected, the guidance would direct the vehicle into
a simulated hazardous landing location.
Navigation Error on Landing
The navigation failure scenario introduced an
error in the spacecraft’s navigation solution. The
landing phase navigation error resulted in the trajectory
being 136 m short (along track deviation) and 61 m left
(cross track deviation) from the nominal landing site.
These deviations, if undetected, would drive the
vehicle into a simulated hazardous landing location.
Pilot Procedures
The EPs were instructed to complete the approach
or landing if they determined that the maneuver could
be completed safely. They were instructed to closely
monitor the autoland approach and to land the Lunar
Lander vehicle as close as possible to the center of the
landing site. If they felt that the final approach
maneuver was unsafe, they were instructed to perform
an abort. (An abort was initiated by a button press on
the joystick.) The EPs were not given the option to
take-over manual control of the vehicle until reaching
the hover point. It was stressed that initiating an abort
should not be taken lightly. However, it was also
stressed that if they felt the mission was unsafe for the
crew or vehicle that an abort should be performed.
If the EPs felt that the landing site was not safe for
landing, they could choose a new landing site based on
the OTW view and display concept provided to them.
Choosing the new landing site was accomplished
through a 4-step redesignation process: 1) press and
hold front trigger button on controller; 2) move
controller to desired new landing site; 3) release trigger
button; and 4) press button on side of controller to
confirm new landing site.
If an abort was initiated, the evaluation run was
ended once terrain clearance was increasing.
The EPs were trained to recognize and understand
the terrain imagery provided to them OTW,
synthetically through a database, or imaged by a FLIR
or LIDAR sensor. They were also trained on cross-
checking different symbology elements to verify the
integrity of their vehicles’ navigation solution. The
EPs were trained on both the redesignation and abort
procedures. The non-normal runs were neither briefed
nor included in the training runs.
Prior to run commencement, the EP was briefed
on the type of task (approach or landing) to be
completed, the display concept to be evaluated
(Baseline, EV, SV, Fused EV/SV), and the OTW view
to be used (Small, Large).
Experiment Matrix
Nominal Run Matrix
Nominally, eight training runs and twenty
experimental runs were completed by each EP. Of the
20 experimental runs, 6 non-normal runs were included
to investigate the pilot's awareness and reaction to
unexpected events and conditions ( e.g., failures). The
non-normal data are critical determinants in the
underlying safety of spacecraft operations.
For approach runs, the experiment matrix
consisted of a full factorial combination of display
concept (Baseline, EV, SV) and OTW view (Small,
Large) for a total of 6 runs. At the altitudes being
flown for the approach trajectories, the SV and Fused
EV/SV concepts were identical so only one of the two,
the SV concept, was chosen for evaluation.
For landing runs, the experiment matrix consisted
of a full-factorial combination of display concept
(Baseline, EV, SV, Fused EV/SV) and OTW view
(Small, Large) for a total of 8 runs.
A within-subjects design was employed for the
nominal approach and landing runs.
Off-Nominal Run Matrix
Each EP flew 6 non-normal runs (3 off-nominal
conditions by 2 OTW view conditions): (a) guidance
error on final approach, (b) guidance error during
landing, and (c) navigation error during landing
combined with either (a) a Small OTW view condition
or (b) a Large OTW view condition.
A between-subjects design was employed for the
non-normal approach and landing runs.
Measures
During each run, pilot inputs (e.g., landing site
redesignation or abort initiation) and landing variables
(distance from landing site center, lateral landing
speed, and vertical landing speed) were measured for
analysis.
After each run, EPs completed a run questionnaire
consisting of the NASA Task Load Index (TLX)
workload rating [ 12], Situation Awareness Rating
Technique (SART) [12], and Likert-type (5-point)
questions specific to monitoring an approach or
manually taking over and landing the vehicle. The
approach questionnaire (Figure 5) had the EPs self-rate
their awareness of lunar surface terrain and terrain
hazards as well as their awareness of the vehicle’s
energy state, attitude, altitude above the lunar surface,
and trajectory. Similarly, the landing questionnaire
(Figure 6) asked the EPs to self-rate their ability to
recognize the landing zone, pick up visual references to
aid landing, and complete the landing as well as their
awareness of lunar hazards (e.g., boulders, no-fly
areas), altitude above the lunar surface, and vehicle
attitude.
After data collection was completed, EPs were
administered two paired comparison tests: the Situation
Awareness – Subjective Workload Dominance (SA-
SWORD) [13] and Subjective Workload Dominance
(SWORD) [12] techniques.
Figure 5. Approach Post-Run Questionnaire
Figure 6. Landing Post-Run Questionnaire
Test Conduct
The EPs were given a 1-hour briefing to explain
the experiment purpose, display concepts, pilot
procedures, and the evaluation tasks. After the
briefing, a 1-hour training session in VISTAS-III was
conducted to familiarize the EPs with the vehicle’s
handling qualities, display symbologies, pilot
procedures, and controls. The EP’s responsibility for
maintaining safe operations at all times was stressed.
Data collection lasted approximately 4.5 hours and was
followed by debriefings which included the
SWORD/SA-SWORD paired comparisons tests. The
entire session including lunch and breaks lasted
approximately 8 hours.
Results
Nominal and off-nominal approach and landing
run results are presented.
The nominal run results are divided into 4
sections: 1) landing performance, 2) mental workload,
3) situation awareness; and 4) post-run questionnaire
ratings. The mental workload section includes EP
post-run NASA TLX ratings and post-test SWORD
ratings for the approach and landing tasks. The
Situation Awareness section includes EP post-run
SART ratings and post-test SA-SWORD ratings.
The off-nominal results are divided into 3
sections: 1) guidance error on approach, 2) guidance
error on landing, and 3) navigation error on landing.
Within the off-nominal results sections, EP reactions to
these errors are discussed. In addition, the EPs post-
run SART ratings, NASA TLX ratings, and post-run
questionnaire ratings are presented in each section.
For the landing performance measures and post-
run SART, TLX, and questionnaire ratings, analysis of
variance (ANOVA) techniques were used with display
concept and OTW view (Small, Large) as the main
factors. For the post-test SWORD and SA-SWORD
paired comparisons, simple ANOVAs were conducted
across the display concept only. When necessary,
Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) post-hoc tests with a
set at 0.05 were performed.
Landing Performance
Landing performance was assessed for the
nominal runs using distance from landing site center
(nominal value of 0 m), lateral landing speed (nominal
value of 0 m/s), and vertical landing speed (nominal
value of -1 m/s).
Distance from Landing Site Center
An ANOVA revealed no significant differences
(p>0.05) for display concept (Baseline, EV, SV, Fused
EV/SV), OTW view (Small, Large), or the interaction
between these two factors for the distance from landing
site center measure. The overall mean distance from
the landing site center was 0.23 m, with a standard
deviation, 6=0.22 m.
Landing Speeds
Similar to distance from the landing site results, a
multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) revealed that none
of the main factors or their interactions were
significant (p>0.05) for either the lateral or vertical
landing speeds, with an overall mean lateral landing
speed of 0.002 m/s (with 6=0.008 m/s) and vertical
landing speed of -0.04 m/s (with 6=0.08 m/s).
Mental Workload
Mental workload was assessed after each
experimental run, using the NASA TLX, and post-test,
using the SWORD technique.
NASA TLX is a multi-dimensional rating
procedure that derives an overall workload score based
on a weighted average of ratings on six subscales
(mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand,
performance, effort, and frustration level). The NASA
TLX subscales went from 0 (Low) to 100 (High) for
the workload ratings and the raw weighted scoring
procedure was used. TLX ratings were provided for
every data run and experimental condition.
EPs were administered the paired-comparison
SWORD scale that enabled comparative ratings of
mental workload. Mental workload was defined for
the EPs as “the amount of cognitive resources available
to perform a task and the difficulty of that task.” The
paired-comparison test was structured to only compare
the display concepts ( i.e., Baseline, EV, SV, Fused
EV/SV) flown by the EP. It did not include the
experimental variation of Small and Large OTW
views.
NASA TLX for Nominal Runs
Approach Operations: An ANOVA revealed that
display concept (Baseline, EV, SV), OTW view
(Small, Large), and the second order interaction
between these two factors were not significant
(p>0.05) for mental workload ratings during the
Approach task. The overall mean approach workload
rating was 26, indicating a moderately-low mental
workload level during the lunar landing runs.
Landing Operations: An ANOVA revealed that
display concept (Baseline, EV, SV, Fused EV/SV),
OTW view (Small, Large), and the interaction between
these two factors was not significant (p>0.05) for pilot
mental workload ratings during landing operations.
The overall mean landing workload rating was 40,
indicating a little less than moderate mental workload
level during the lunar landing runs.
SWORD
The post-test paired-comparison SWORD data
indicated that display concept (F(3,28)=138.34,
p<0.001 was highly significant for the pilot ratings of
mental workload. Post-hoc tests (SNK using a=0.05)
showed two unique subsets for the mental workload
ratings with the 4 display concepts: 1) Fused EV/SV,
EV, and SV display concepts (lowest workload) and 2)
Baseline (highest workload).
Workload Discussion
TLX ratings indicate that overall pilot workload
was very manageable and that there were no significant
display differences or OTW view differences for this
measure in either the approach or landing task. As
expected, EPs rated the monitoring (approach) task as
requiring less mental workload than the flying
(landing) task.
Post-test SWORD ratings revealed that mental
workload was significantly reduced when terrain
imagery was provided on the EV, SV, and Fused
EV/SV displays compared to when it wasn’t (with the
Baseline concept). The SWORD mental workload
ratings did not consider the OTW vertical view
provided to the EP.
Situation Awareness
Situation awareness was assessed after each
experimental run, using the post-run SART, and post-
test, using the SA-SWORD measures.
SART is a multi-dimensional rating technique
using the constructs of: 1) demand on attentional
resources; 2) supply of attentional resources; and, 3)
understanding. From these components, the SART
rating is “understanding” reduced by the difference of
“demand” minus “supply” (i.e., SART =
{(understanding) – (demand – supply)}). SART
ratings were provided for every data run and
configuration.
Similar to the SWORD described above, the SA-
SWORD is a paired-comparison technique that
provides relative situation awareness ratings. For these
comparisons, SA was defined as “the pilot’s awareness
and understanding of all factors that will contribute to
the safe flying of their aircraft under normal and non-
normal conditions.” The paired-comparison test was
structured to compare only the display concepts ( i.e.,
Baseline, EV, SV, Fused EV/SV) flown by the EP.
Note that this comparison did not explicitly include the
experimental variation of Small and Large OTW
views.
The SA-SWORD measure differs from the post-
run SART measure construct as it is a paired-
comparison test, it was administered post-test for all
configurations, and the underlying definition and
construct for the SA ratings are different.
SART for Nominal Runs
Approach Operations: An ANOVA revealed that
display concept (Baseline, EV, SV) was significant
(F(2,14)=4.97, p<0.05) for post-run approach SA
ratings, but OTW view (Small, Large) and the second
order interaction between display concept and OTW
view were not significant (p>0.05) for this measure.
Post-hoc tests showed that the Baseline concept
provided significantly lower SA than either the EV or
SV display concepts. There were no significant
differences between the EV and SV display concepts
for this SA measure.
Landing Operations: An ANOVA revealed that
display concept (Baseline, EV, SV, Fused EV/SV) was
significant (F(3,21)=3.36, p<0.05) for post-run landing
SA ratings, but OTW view (Small, Large) and the
second order interaction between display concept and
OTW view were not significant (p>0.05) for this
measure. Post-hoc tests showed two overlapping
subsets for the display concepts: 1) Baseline, EV, SV
concepts (lower SA) and 2) EV, SV, Fused EV/SV
concepts (higher SA). The Baseline concept had
significantly less SA than the Fused EV/SV concept
during nominal landing runs.
SA-SWORD
The post-test SA-SWORD data indicate that
display concept (F(3, 28)=36.16, p<0.001) was highly
significant for the pilot ratings of SA. Post-hoc tests
(SNK using a=0.05) showed three unique subsets for
the SA ratings with the 4 display concepts: 1) Fused
EV/SV (highest SA); 2) EV and SV; 3) Baseline
(lowest SA).
Situation Awareness Discussion
Having terrain imagery on the flight displays
appears to have a more profound effect on SA ratings
than the amount of OTW visibility provided to the
pilots for both the landing task and approach task
evaluated in this experiment. Statistically significant
post-run SART rating differences indicated SA
improvements when terrain imagery was used in the
display concepts compared to when it wasn’t in the
Baseline condition.
The absence of SA differences in the landing task
for the OTW visibility differences may have been
attributable to the fact that a Head-Up Display was not
available, so target redesignation required head-down
information. Also, in the manual flying portion of the
task - from hover to touchdown – the small and large
OTW views were the same and neither provided a
natural vision view of the landing zone.
Interestingly, for the landing task, EPs only found
significant SA improvements when the terrain imagery
was with the fused EV/SV concept compared to the
Baseline. The SV and EV conditions were not
significantly different than either of these in the post-
run SART measure (but they were better than the
Baseline in the post-test SA-SWORD comparisons).
This result possibly indicates the EP’s need for
independent sources of terrain information head-down,
for sufficiency and comparative purposes.
Similar to the post-run landing SART results, the
post-test SA-SWORD ratings revealed that the best SA
was found with the fused EV/SV concept. (These
post-test SA-SWORD ratings did not consider the
OTW vertical view provided to the EP.)
Post-Run Questionnaire Ratings
Approach Operations
A MANOVA on the post-run approach questions
(Figure 5) revealed that display concept was significant
for Question 4 – awareness of the spacecraft’s
trajectory (F(2,14)--6.94, p<0.01) and Question 5 –
awareness of lunar surface terrain and terrain hazards
(F(2,14)--23.72, p<0.01) and that OTW view was
significant for Question 2 – awareness of spacecraft’s
attitude (F(1,7)--5.65, p<0.05).
Post-hoc tests revealed two unique subsets for the
display concepts with regard to awareness of the
spacecraft’s trajectory: 1) EV (mean=1.8) and SV
(mean--2.1) concepts provided “good” awareness, and
2) the Baseline concept (mean--2.8) provided
“adequate” awareness. Similarly, post-hoc tests
revealed two unique subsets for awareness of lunar
surface terrain and terrain hazards: 1) EV (mean--2.3)
and SV (mean--2.2) concepts provided “good”
awareness and 2) the Baseline concept (mean--4.1)
provided “poor” awareness.
Both the Small (mean--1.8) and Large (mean--2.0)
OTW view conditions were rated as providing “good”
awareness of the spacecraft’s attitude. Although
statistically different, the differences in ratings for
these two OTW views are operationally
inconsequential.
Landing Operations
A MANOVA (and subsequent post hoc tests) on
the post-run landing questionnaire ratings (Figure 6)
revealed that for:
Question 1 – ability to recognize the designated
landing zone – both display concept (F(3,21)--6.44,
p<0.01) and OTW view (F(1,7)--22.87, p<0.01) were
significant. The Baseline concept (mean--2.4) was
rated as being significantly different than the EV, SV,
and Fused EV/SV concepts (mean--1.5) but all display
concepts were in the “acceptable” to “good” range for
this measure. Although statistically different, the
Large OTW view (mean--1.5) and the Small OTW
view (mean--1.9) ratings were both in the “good” range
for this measure.
Question 2 – awareness of altitude above the lunar
surface – OTW view (F(1,7)--22.87, p<0.01) was
significant. Although statistically different, the Large
OTW view (mean--1.4) and the Small OTW view
(mean--1.8) ratings were both in the “good” range for
this measure.
Question 3 – awareness of spacecraft’s attitude –
neither display concept nor OTW view were significant
(p>0.05).
Question 4 – ability to pick up visual references to
aid landing – display concept (F(3,21)--6.41, p<0.01)
was significant. The Baseline concept (mean--2.6) was
rated as being significantly different than the EV, SV,
and Fused EV/SV concepts (mean--1.7) but all display
concepts were in the “acceptable” to “good” range for
this measure.
Question 5 – ability to complete the landing –
both display concept (F(3,21)--6.36, p<0.01) and OTW
view (F(1,7)--5.72, p<0.05) were significant. The
Baseline concept (mean=2.1) was rated as being
significantly different than the EV, SV, and Fused
EV/SV concepts (mean--1.4) but all display concepts
were in the “good” range for this measure. Although
statistically different, the Large OTW view (mean--1.4)
and the Small OTW view (mean--1.8) ratings were
both in the “good” range for this measure.
Question 6 – awareness of lunar hazards (e.g.,
boulders, no fly areas – both display concept
(F(3,21)--6.32, p<0.05) and OTW view (F(1,7)--8.0,
p<0.01) were significant. The Baseline concept
(mean--2.9) was rated as being significantly different
than the EV, SV, and Fused EV/SV concepts
(mean--1.8) but all display concepts were in the
“acceptable” to “good” range for this measure.
Although statistically different, the Large OTW view
(mean--1.8) and the Small OTW view (mean--2.3)
ratings were both in the “good” range for this measure.
Post-Run Questionnaire Ratings Discussion
No operationally significant OTW view
differences were found in either the approach or
landing post-run questionnaire ratings. In general,
display concepts with EV and/or SV imagery were
preferred over the no-terrain Baseline condition as they
improved an EP’s ability to land safely due to
increased awareness of elements such as the landing
site, terrain, and hazards within the lunar landing
environment.
Off-Nominal Scenarios
Guidance Error on Approach
All EPs who experienced a guidance error on
approach recognized the potential flight into terrain
and aborted the approach. However, one EP while
flying with the EV display concept in the Small OTW
view condition pressed the abort button too late and
actually impacted the lunar terrain. The EP’s only
sources of terrain information in this run were the EV
imagery and the radar altitude information on the
displays as there was no terrain visible in the Small
OTW view.
EP post-run Approach Questionnaire ratings
(Figure 5, Question 5) revealed that the Baseline
display concept offered significantly less awareness of
lunar surface terrain and terrain hazards, F(3, 8) = 6.44,
p<0.05, compared to the other three concepts tested
that employed EV and/or SV terrain imagery for the
approach guidance error runs. The Baseline concept
had a mean rating of 3.8 which equated to “poor
awareness” on the post-run Likert scale and the other
concepts had a mean rating of 1.5 which equated to
“good awareness” on that same scale. There were no
significant differences between the Small and Large
OTW view conditions for this questionnaire rating
measure. In addition, there were no significant
differences (p>0.05) between the display concepts or
the OTW view conditions for the EP SART ratings,
TLX ratings, or remaining four Post-Run
Questionnaire ratings (Figure 5) for the guidance error
on approach runs.
Guidance Error on Landing
All but one landing guidance error run was
detected by the EPs. This one undetected error run was
with the Baseline concept with Small OTW view. For
this one run, the EP didn’t have the lunar landing cue
head-down on the Baseline display concept or visible
within the Small OTW view. The only cues were the
terrain over 100m downrange of the landing site to
recognize s/he wasn’t landing in the correct location.
Post-run EP ratings (Figure 6, Question 6) for the
guidance error on landing runs indicated that EPs had
significantly (F(3,128)=6.0, p<0.05) better awareness
of lunar hazards (e.g., boulder, no fly areas) with the
three concepts employing EV and/or SV than when
using the Baseline concept. EPs also reported (Figure
6, Question 1) they were significantly (F(3,8)=4.21,
p<0.05) better at recognizing the designated landing
zone with the EV and Fused EV/SV concepts
compared to the Baseline concept. Post-hoc tests
revealed two overlapping subsets for the display
concepts: 1) EV (mean rating=1.5), Fused EV/SV
(mean rating=2.0), SV (mean rating=2.3) and 2) Fused
EV/SV, SV, and Baseline (mean rating=3.5) for this
measure. There were no significant display concept
differences for EP SART ratings, TLX ratings or
remaining post-run questionnaire ratings (Figure 6) for
the guidance error on landing runs.
Post-run SART and Landing Questionnaire
ratings (Figure 6, Question 5) indicated that EPs had
significantly higher SA (F(1,8)=7.35, p<0.05) and
better ability in completing the landing (F(1,8)=6.67,
p<0.05) when using the Large OTW view compared to
the Small OTW view for the landing guidance error
runs. The Large OTW view (mean=1.8) was in the
“good” range for the EP’s ability to complete the
landing, but the Small OTW view (mean=3.4) was
approaching the “poor” range in the EP’s ability to
complete the landing. There were no significant OTW
view differences for EP TLX ratings or the other post-
run landing questionnaire ratings for the guidance error
on landing runs.
Navigation Error on Landing
All EPs who experienced a navigation error with
either the SV or Baseline display concepts either failed
to recognize the failure or re-designated but landed on
another hazard (i.e., a simulated LIDAR-detected
hazard). For all EV and Fused EV/SV display runs,
EPs recognized the navigation error and were able to
re-designate to a safe landing site.
Post-run Landing Questionnaire ratings (Figure 6,
Questions 1 and 6) revealed that the EV and Fused
EV/SV display concepts were rated as being
significantly easier for recognizing the designated
landing zone (F(3,8)=5.08, p<0.05) and for awareness
of lunar hazards such as boulders and no fly zones
(F(3,8)=6.12, p<0.05) than the Baseline concept. The
Baseline concept was also rated (Figure 6, Question 4)
as being significantly worse in aiding the pilot in
picking up visual cues to aid landing (F(3,8)=5.82,
p<0.05) than the EV, SV, and Fused EV/SV display
concepts. There were no significant display concept
differences for EP SART ratings, TLX ratings or
remaining post-run questionnaire ratings (Figure 6) for
the landing navigation error runs.
There were also no significant (p>0.05) OTW
view differences for the EP SART ratings, TLX
ratings, or any of the post-test questionnaire ratings
(Figure 6) for the landing navigation error runs.
Off-Nominal Scenario Discussion
Regardless of the display concept and OTW view
condition evaluated, EPs recognized and correctly
reacted (by performing an abort) to the approach
guidance error runs. However, one abort, while
monitoring the approach with the EV display concept
in the Small OTW view condition, was initiated too
late and the vehicle was unable to gain altitude and
impacted the lunar terrain. Even though the EP had
been trained in the time needed for the vehicle to retard
its downward velocity and begin gaining altitude once
an abort had been initiated (and had EV terrain
imagery on the flight displays), this result
demonstrated a lack of timely terrain awareness. The
data, otherwise, suggests that the tested display or
OTW visibility conditions were all sufficient to
circumvent this off-nominal condition.
EPs correctly identified unannounced guidance
errors during landings when using the display
concepts with EV, SV or Fused EV/SV display
imagery for both OTW view conditions and when
using the Baseline concept with the Large OTW view.
However, one run (of the two tested landing guidance
error runs) was not recognized by the EP while using
the Baseline concept with the Small OTW view, most
likely due to not being able to cross-check the lunar
landing cue in the EV or SV imagery on the head-
down flight displays and OTW with natural vision.
All landing navigation error runs were detected
and redesignated to a “safe” landing site when using
the EV and Fused EV/SV display concepts with either
OTW condition. The results showed that the EV
imagery provided an intuitive and obvious visual
methodology to monitor the validity of the vehicle’s
navigation solution. However, all EPs who
experienced a navigation failure with either the SV or
Baseline displays (using either the Small or Large
OTW view conditions) either failed to recognize the
failure or re-designated but landed in a simulated
hazardous area. For the Baseline (no terrain imagery
provided) and SV display concepts, the EPs had to rely
on the OTW view of the lunar landing cue (only
available in the Large OTW view) and recognition of
the lunar terrain features (e.g., boulders on the surface)
and their position with respect to these cues to alert
them of a poor navigation solution.
Concluding Remarks
An experiment was conducted evaluating the
contribution of enhanced vision (EV) and/or synthetic
vision (SV) to displays of a Lunar Lander vehicle
during both nominal and off nominal approaches and
landings to the lunar surface. As expected, manual
landing performance was excellent (within a meter of
the landing site center) for the nominal runs regardless
if terrain imagery was provided or not provided on the
Lunar Lander flight displays. Significant SA
improvements were found with the Fused EV/SV
display concept compared to the Baseline condition
that had no terrain imagery during normal approach
and landing operations. Mental workload was
manageable for all display concepts tested. There were
no significant OTW view differences for pilot SA or
workload ratings which may indicate that fuel-efficient
approaches may be feasible if terrain imagery is
provided on the head-down flight displays.
Subjective and objective off-nominal results
support the inclusion SV and EV imagery on fight deck
displays for lunar approach and landing, matching our
expectations based on aviation-domain research with
these technologies. These data emphasize the
importance of having a real-time method of monitoring
the navigation performance. As shown here, real-time
sensors, such as EV, are one method to perform this
function as a complement to SV.
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